Expressing Emotion and Fairness Crowding-out in an Ultimatum Game with Incomplete Information by Chen, Josie I & Kamei, Kenju
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Expressing Emotion and Fairness
Crowding-out in an Ultimatum Game
with Incomplete Information
Josie I Chen and Kenju Kamei
Brown University, Bowling Green State University
13. March 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54405/
MPRA Paper No. 54405, posted 13. March 2014 15:21 UTC
1 
 
 
Expressing Emotion and Fairness Crowding-out in an  
Ultimatum Game with Incomplete Information  
 
Josie I Chen
1
, Kenju Kamei
2,*
 
1
 Department of Economics, Brown University, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI 02912, USA.   
2 
Department of Economics, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA.  
 
Abstract:  
Recent experimental research has shown that when rating systems are available, buyers are more 
generous in accepting unfair offers made by sellers. It has also shown that sellers make fairer 
decisions when they are rated, while some studies show that they are little affected by the rating 
systems. These studies are conducted under complete information settings. However, asymmetric 
information about the values of traded commodities between sellers and buyers may change their 
perception of fairness and thus may change sellers’ decisions. We conduct ultimatum game 
experiments in which only the sellers are informed of the size of pies. We find that when rating 
systems are available to the buyers, the buyers become more amenable to potentially unfair offers. 
We also find that sellers attempt to sell the commodity at higher prices, taking advantage of the 
buyers’ openness to potentially unfair offers, contrary to the past studies with complete 
information.  
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Research highlights 
 
 
 We experimentally study ultimatum games where only the sellers are informed of the size of 
the pie. 
 
 The buyers are more open to potentially unfair offers when they are given opportunities to rate 
their matched sellers. 
 
 The sellers make more unfair offers when the buyers are given opportunities to rate them. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Imagine that you have an old car that you would like to sell and that only you know its true 
value. Suppose that a person, a stranger to you, is considering purchasing a used car. Moreover, 
suppose that there is a law that demands you make yourself available to the buyer for one year so 
that you can receive comments or complaints after you sell the car to her. How do you think you 
would set the price of your car to the potential buyer? Would the presence of such a feedback 
system cause you to behave in a fairer manner, as you will want to avoid receiving criticism from 
the buyer? Or, would you try to sell it at a more unfair price, as you expect, for example, that your 
feelings of obligation to behave fairly may diminish as you can instead listen to criticism from the 
buyer, or that the buyer may trust you more because of the feedback system? 
 In recent decades, economists have devoted effort to studying the impact of expressing 
emotion on people’s behavior under complete information settings, and have found that emotional 
expression may affect both senders and recipients. On the one hand, it has been documented that 
people have preferences against receiving disapproval from others and consequently they behave 
pro-socially so that they do not receive negative feedback. For instance, in a standard linear public 
goods game where full free-riding is a strictly dominant strategy, when subjects are given an 
opportunity to give social approval or disapproval points to each other, the recipients of social 
disapproval are more likely to raise contributions (e.g., Masclet et al. 2003, Dugar 2011). In a 
dictator game, dictators are less likely to make an unfair division of a pie when receivers have ex-
post opportunities to express emotion to their dictators (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008, 
Xiao and Houser 2009).
1
 In a prisoner’s dilemma game, subjects are more likely to cooperate if 
they are given an ex-post opportunity to send a message to their partners at their own expense (e.g., 
López-Pérez and Vorsatz 2010). On the other hand, expressing emotion has also been known to 
affect the behavior of senders of emotion as well, as expressing emotion can be considered as a 
substitute of being engaged in real actions. For example, in ultimatum games, buyers (responders) 
are more likely to accept unfair offers, when given opportunities to express emotion (e.g., Xiao and 
Houser 2005, Güth and Levati 2007). This suggests that expressing negative emotion is a 
substitute for punishing their matched sellers (proposers) or perhaps even for obtaining a fair deal. 
                                                             
1  In an ultimatum game the same does not hold: the percentage of unfair offers only insignificantly decreases (e.g., 
Xiao and Houser 2005, Güth and Levati 2007). 
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 In this paper, we study the effects of expressing emotion by conducting an ultimatum game 
experiment in which only the sellers are informed of the size of a pie (incomplete information). 
Our purpose is to propose and explore the idea that opportunities for expressing emotion may 
adversely affect the behavior of those who receive emotion in this environment. This hypothesis is 
counter-intuitive to some degree and appears to contradict the aforementioned recent findings on 
the significance of the disapproval-averse preferences under complete information settings. 
However, since the presence of an institution on which emotion is conveyed gives an individual an 
option of simply receiving negative emotion or criticism rather than feeling obligated to behave in 
an acceptable manner and actually doing so, motivation to act fairly may be crowded out and 
selfish behavior may instead be stimulated when such an institution is present. Accordingly, if the 
emotional expression generates the negative effect, which we call the “fairness crowding-out 
effect,” and if it is stronger than the disapproval-averse motive, then we can expect that the 
recipients of emotion may behave more selfishly. As a result, the emotional expressing 
opportunities can be more adverse to those expressing emotion.  
 Understanding the effects of expressing emotion under the asymmetric information setting 
is especially important for two reasons. First, the incomplete information setup is more realistic in 
some circumstances, including the example of the used car in the market mentioned above. Second, 
the asymmetric information between sellers and buyers may significantly change their perceptions 
of fairness. While many experiments have demonstrated that people have preferences for fair 
outcomes in ultimatum games with complete information (see Roth (1995) for a survey), some 
studies have also shown that sellers can become greedier and their offering prices may be close to 
the ones that the standard theory predicts in incomplete information setups (e.g., Straub and 
Murnighan 1995, Rapoport et al. 1996, Croson 1996, Güth et al. 1996, Mitzkewitz and Nagel 
1993). If the fairness crowding-out mentioned above is prevalent as we conjecture, and if the 
relative strength between the two countervailing effects depends on the information condition, then 
we may observe a  more materially beneficial effect of a rating system on individuals who are 
rated unlike the findings of the previous studies, as selfish behavior triggered by the fairness 
crowding-out may be greater than the disapproval aversion under incomplete information. 
 Our experimental design is straightforward. Each subject is randomly divided into either 
the role of seller or that of buyer. Each seller has one commodity whose value is randomly drawn 
from integers between 0 and 40, and is randomly matched with a buyer. Sellers submit their 
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offering prices, and buyers submit their purchase thresholds. If a seller’s offering price is less than 
or equal to his or her matched buyer’s purchase threshold, then, the deal is closed. In some 
treatments, buyers are given opportunities to rate their matched sellers on a 10-point scale after 
learning their transaction outcomes. Our data clearly indicates that the buyers on average submit 
higher purchase thresholds when they are given ex-post opportunities to rate their sellers. This 
finding is consistent with the results of recent ultimatum game experiments with complete 
information and implies that expressing emotion can be a substitute for rejecting offers for the 
buyers. However, we find that with the rating system, the sellers on average set higher prices for 
each randomly drawn value of commodities, which is a new finding. This suggests that receiving 
bad ratings and criticism can be a substitute for behaving in a fair manner; and selfish behavior 
triggered by the fairness crowding-out may be stronger than the disapproval-averse effect under 
incomplete information settings, unlike under complete information settings. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design. 
Section 3 provides theoretical predictions. Section 4 reports results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Experimental Design 
 Our basic framework is a set of finitely repeated ultimatum games with incomplete 
information on the buyers’ side. The quality of the commodity traded between the sellers and the 
buyers is only known to the sellers. The number of periods is 50 and there is no break between 
rounds. Each interaction unit (group) includes ten subjects. Subjects do not interact with subjects 
in other groups. At the onset of the experiment, a group of ten subjects is randomly divided into 
two subgroups of five subjects. Then, five subjects in one subgroup are assigned roles of seller 
(proposer) and the five in the other subgroup are assigned roles of buyer (responder).
2
 The initially 
assigned roles are not changed throughout the entire session. The number of periods in the 
experiment and the assignment procedure of the roles are common knowledge of all the subjects. 
 In each period, each seller is randomly matched with a buyer in his or her group. Since 
there are five buyers and five sellers in a group, the probability that a seller is matched with the 
same buyer both in period t and period t − 1 is 20%. In each round, each seller has one commodity 
                                                             
2
 In the experimental sessions, two subsets of subjects are called “buyers” and “sellers” as written in the paper. The 
framing of buyers and sellers is often used in experiments with ultimatum games (e.g., Roth et al. 1991).  
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whose quality is the same across all five sellers in his or her group. The quality (true value) of the 
commodity, qt, is randomly drawn from the set of integers ranging from 0 to 40 every period. This 
means that each integer is realized at a probability of 1/41. The random drawing process is 
independent across periods, and the distribution of qt is common knowledge of all subjects. 
However, only sellers learn the realized value of the commodity. In other words, qt is the private 
information of the sellers. This set-up is similar to the experimental design of ultimatum games 
with incomplete information such as Rapoport et al. (1995). For example, in Rapoport et al., the 
size of the pie in an ultimatum game is randomly distributed from a uniform distribution [a, b] and 
the realized size is the private information of the sellers.  
 The decisions that our subjects make in the experiment are similar to the ones in a standard 
strategy method ultimatum game. Each seller will propose a price psj to sell a commodity to his or 
her matched buyer. They can sell at most one commodity. psj must be an integer ranging from 0 to 
40. Each buyer, by contrast, simultaneously submits a purchase threshold pbi to his or her matched 
seller.
3
 If psj ≤ pbi, a deal is closed between i and j; the seller obtains a payoff of psj − qt/2, and the 
buyer obtains a payoff of qt – psj. Here, qt/2 is recognized as the production cost of a commodity or 
the value of it for the seller. If psj > pbi, then a deal is not closed; the payoffs of both players are 
zero in the period. Note that when a deal is closed, if qt – psj < 0, the buyer incurs a loss. The 
buyers learn the realized value of the commodity (qt) at the end of each period. Subjects are paid 
based on the sum of their own payoffs earned during all 50 periods.
4
  
 We vary treatments by rating opportunities to buyers. In the “No Information, No Rating” 
treatment, abbreviated as N treatment, subjects play the aforementioned game 50 times. This 
treatment is a baseline treatment in this study. In the Rating treatment, dubbed as R treatment, each 
buyer is given an opportunity to rate their matched seller on a 10-point scale every round after 
learning their transaction outcome including their own payoff and their matched seller’s payoff. 
Buyers are instructed that the lowest number, 0, means “very unfair;” 3 means “unfair;” 7 means 
“fair;” and the highest number, 10, means “very fair.” While the buyers are making their rating 
decisions, the sellers are asked to submit a price that they would offer if they had a second chance 
                                                             
3
 Strategy methods are widely used in experiments with ultimatum games. The benefit of using the strategy methods is 
to elicit the upper bound of the buyer’s purchase (acceptance) decisions. With the standard, sequential direct-response 
method, we only observe a buyer’s acceptance decision to a specific offer, not the threshold.  Past studies find little 
difference in behavior between the two methods when used in ultimatum games with incomplete information on the 
buyer's side (see Brandts and Charness 2011 for a survey).  
4
 $5 is guaranteed for their participation in case their accumulated payoff is less than $5.  
7 
 
to sell the commodity whose value was the same as the current value. The questionnaire to the 
seller is hypothetical and non-incentivized.
5
  
 In addition to the N and R treatments, we also conduct the Social Information treatment, 
dubbed as SI treatment, and the “Social Information and Rating” treatment, abbreviated as SI-R 
treatment. In the N and R treatments, each seller is randomly matched with a buyer every round. 
Also, q is randomly drawn every round. It might therefore be difficult for them to reach agreement 
(equilibrium) quickly. Making information on other sellers’ transaction outcomes available to 
sellers could facilitate transactions between sellers and buyers. Thus, adding these two treatments 
serves as a robustness check to compare the N treatment and the R treatment, although the effects 
of social information may be fundamental as discussed in Section 3.3.
6
  In the SI treatment, sellers 
are informed of other sellers’ transaction results in their group at the end of each round. The 
information to be disclosed includes: their offering prices, whether the deals were closed, and the 
sellers’ and their matched buyers’ payoffs.7  Buyers in the SI treatment are not given the 
opportunity to rate their matched sellers unlike the R treatment, but buyers in the SI-R treatment 
are given the opportunity to evaluate their matched sellers as in the R treatment. The sellers are 
asked the same hypothetical question while the rating decisions by the buyers are in progress. 
Moreover, the sellers in the SI-R treatment are informed of other sellers’ transaction results in their 
own groups. The information to be disclosed includes all the feedback items containing in the SI 
treatment as well as the rating that each seller received in the current period.  Treatment details are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 At the end of the experiments, demographic information such as gender and the number of 
economics courses taken is collected, along with various open-ended questions. These responses 
are used as control variables in analysis.
8
 
 
  
                                                             
5
 This questionnaire is included so that the number of mouse clicks by the sellers is the same as that by the buyers. 
This is important in order to keep anonymity in the experiment. 
6
 It turns out that the difference in subjects’ behaviors between the SI and SI-R treatments is similar to that between the 
N and R treatments (see Section 4). 
7
 In each period, each seller is randomly given an identification number from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The identification 
numbers appear on the computer screen. However, the identification numbers scramble every period so as to exclude 
reputation effects. In other words, seller 1 on period t computer screen is the same as seller 1 on period t-1 screen with 
a probability of 20%.  
8
 Instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
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3.  Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses 
3.1. Price Setting and Purchase Threshold in the N Treatment 
In each period in the experiment, each seller is randomly matched with a buyer and their 
identification number is also randomly assigned to them. Subjects do not have access to the 
information on their matched partners’ past history of decisions. As discussed in Section 2, the 
number of interactions is finite and is common knowledge to both buyers and sellers.  Therefore, 
although each buyer (seller) is matched with the same seller (buyer) in the following period with a 
probability of 20%, the standard theory prediction in the experiment is the same for each stage 
game. Thus, we devote this section to an analysis of their optimal behavior in each stage game in 
isolation.  
 If the randomly drawn value of the object, qt, was known both to buyers and sellers, then 
any prices which are greater than or equal to qt/2 can be offered by the sellers under Nash 
Equilibrium in each stage game, as in the standard ultimatum game with strategy method.  When a 
seller offers a price p that is less than or equal to qt but greater than or equal to qt/2, and the buyer 
submits the same p as his or her purchase threshold, then the seller receives a payoff of p − qt/2 
and the buyer receives a payoff of qt − p; and there is no incentive for each player to change their 
strategy. Moreover, a seller offering a price greater than qt and a buyer setting his or her purchase 
threshold at a value less than or equal to qt/2 also constitutes a Nash Equilibrium. 
In this experiment, however, although the distribution of qt is common knowledge, the 
realized value is private information for the sellers. A seller therefore chooses his or her strategy, 
depending on qt  [0, 40], in order to maximize his or her payoff, whereas the matched buyer 
selects a purchase threshold, pb, irrespective of qt as the buyer is not informed of the value of the 
commodity, so as to maximize his or her expected payoff. As a result, the prediction under the 
assumption of common knowledge of qt no longer holds. We write psj: [0, 40]  [0, 40] as the 
strategy of seller j, and pbi  [0, 40] as the strategy of buyer i. In Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 
(BNE), each player best responds to his or her partner. Although we use a discrete interval {0, 1, 
…, 39, 40} in our experiment, for simplicity, we use a continuous interval [0, 40] in our theoretical 
analysis as the domain of qt, and we focus on the equilibria in which ps is strictly increasing in qt or 
is constant. 
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As shown in Appendix A, we find two kinds of Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE) from the 
seller’s and the buyer’s best response functions. The first kinds of equilibria are the ones in which 
the buyer obtains an expected payoff of 0 and only the seller obtains a positive payoff. For instance, 
the following is an equilibrium: the seller proposes ps =          for      ; and           
for      , and the buyer submits his or her purchase threshold, pb = c. Here, c is any constant 
that is less than or equal to 20. We see that the expected payoff of the buyer in this example of the 
equilibria equals         
 
  
   
  
 
  , whereas the payoff of the seller is calculated by: 
  
 
 
   when qt ≤ 2c and 0 when qt > 2c. The seller’s payoff is therefore dependent on qt, and is 
positive when      . 
Although there are multiple BNE of this class, the expected payoff of the seller differs by 
equilibrium, and is maximized when the following equilibrium is realized: ps =           for all 
qt, and pb = 20. The expected payoff of the seller is then calculated as: 
          
 
 
    
 
  
   
  
 
   . (1) 
This implies that the Pareto dominant (socially optimal) BNE is that the seller, regardless of qt, 
proposes to sell the commodity at a price of 20, and the buyer sets the purchase threshold at the 
price of 20, although then the inequality in payoffs between the seller and the buyer is maximized. 
 The second class of BNE is the one in which the transaction is not executed. For example, 
the following is an equilibrium: the seller always posts a price that is greater than or equal to 20, 
and the buyer sets his or her purchase threshold at 0. In this class of equilibrium, both the seller 
and the buyer obtain a payoff of 0. 
     
Prediction 1: Standard theory predictions. 
There are two different classes of Bayesian Nash Equilibria: 
(1) The transaction between a seller and a buyer occurs at prices less than or equal to 20. The 
buyer obtains an expected payoff of 0, whereas the seller obtains a non-negative payoff. Out of the 
potential equilibria in our experiment, the Pareto optimal BNE is when the transaction always 
occurs at a price of 20 and the seller obtains a payoff of 10. This is the seller’s payoff dominant 
equilibrium as well. 
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(2) The transaction does not occur. In this kind of equilibrium, both the seller and the buyer obtain 
a payoff of 0. An example is that a seller posts a price that is greater than or equal to 20 for any q, 
and the buyer sets a purchase threshold at 0.  
      
We can also consider behavioral predictions from a fairness perspective. A rich body of the 
literature on experiments, including bargaining environments (e.g., ultimatum games and dictator 
games), has demonstrated that people prefer fair outcomes. If we assume that all of our subjects 
have inequality-averse preferences and that they know so, then sellers no longer attempt to sell a 
commodity at prices so that buyers’ payoffs are zero, as their inequality-averse buyers would not 
accept such offers and inequality-averse sellers would also prefer fairer outcomes. Buyer i, when 
accepting the offer of price psj, would lose some utility if his or her seller obtains a bigger or 
smaller payoff than him or herself. In general, the utility function of an inequality-averse buyer can 
be expressed as:  
 ubi(   ,    ) =     − µi ∙ f(        ), (2) 
where µi indicates the strength of the inequality-averse preferences relative to her material payoff. 
In our theoretical analysis, we use the quadratic function as f(.):
9
 
                      
 
. (3) 
The utility function of seller j is defined likewise:  
 usj(   ,    ) =     − µj ∙ f(        ).  (4) 
Under the hypothesis of the inequality-averse preferences, as shown in Appendix A.2, the seller’s 
best response strategy (price) would depend on the value of object qt unlike the one with a payoff-
maximizing seller, which is to offer a price equal to their matched buyer’s purchase threshold as 
long as it gives himself or herself a positive payoff.  The seller’s offering price is increasing in qt 
when qt is sufficiently smaller than the seller’s belief on the purchase threshold set by his or her 
                                                             
9
 Quadratic functional forms are sometimes used in theoretical analyses of subjects’ behaviors. For example, see 
Cappelen et al. (2013). We note that one of the prominent inequality-averse preferences is provided by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999). In the Fehr-Schmidt model, buyer i’s non-material term is described as: f(       ) =    
                                  ; and the losses are either due to disadvantageous inequality (the first 
term) or advantageous inequality (the second term). Here,        . The Fehr-Schmidt model becomes similar to 
Eq. (3) when      , but it has a kink at        . Our choice of a quadratic function in the analysis is due to its 
tractability, but would not lose very many important implications because of the choice. 
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buyer.
10
  The slope of the offering price (∂ps/∂qt) is less than 1 when qt is small because the seller 
does not want to take everything from the buyer as qt increases. If a realized qt is in some range 
close to the buyer’s purchase threshold, the seller attempts to sell the commodity at a price at 
which the buyer is willing to purchase so that their transaction becomes successful. However, 
when qt is large enough that qt > q*, the seller offers a price strictly greater than the buyer’s 
purchase thresholds in order to prevent their transaction from being closed (see Fig. A.1 in the 
Appendix). This is intuitive because when qt is sufficiently large, the buyer would obtain a higher 
payoff (qt − ps) than the seller’s (ps − qt/2). The expected acceptance rate of offers in a seller’s 
offering price schedule is q*/40. Notice that sellers are assumed to be heterogeneous (µj differs by 
seller). Therefore, the best response offering price schedule and q* differ by µj. The lower the µj is, 
the higher the q* is. 
 In addition to the assumption of inequality-averse preferences of the subjects, we assume 
that sellers would form their beliefs on the matched buyers’ purchase thresholds based on their past 
interaction outcomes. Moreover, buyers, in addition to sellers, are assumed to have heterogeneous 
preferences (µi also differs by buyer); and they meet each other randomly every period. Dependent 
on his or her previously encountered purchase thresholds, the seller adjusts the offering price based 
on his or her best response strategies. Lastly, the quality of the commodity is randomly drawn from 
[0, 40] every period. Considering these experimental setups and assumptions, we expect that the 
realized offering prices are increasing in qt as in the sellers’ best response strategies. Also, we 
expect that the acceptance rate of offers is decreasing in qt, as the higher the qt is, the more sellers 
there are whose best response prices are greater than their matched buyers’ purchase thresholds.11 
      
Prediction 2: Predictions from inequality-averse preferences. 
A seller’s offering price (ps) is increasing in the value of the object, qt. The slope (∂ps/∂qt) is less 
than 1 when qt is small. When qt is sufficiently large, the offering price (ps) is greater than the 
purchase threshold (pb) and the transaction will not occur. Both the buyer and the seller obtain 
some positive payoffs in expectation. The acceptance rate of offers is decreasing in qt. 
    
                                                             
10
 This offering price schedule is optimal unless the seller’s belief about the purchase threshold of her matched buyer is 
very low. See Appendix A.2 for details. 
11
 See Appendix Fig. A.1. q* in Fig. A.1 differs by seller (j).  
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Another kind of prominent social preference model is an intention-based social preference 
model such as a reciprocity model (e.g., Rabin 1993, Charness and Rabin 2002, Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Cox et al. 2007). In a reciprocity model, agents 
react hastily or in an unfair manner to hostile or unfair acts toward them by their opponents. In our 
experiments, buyers have the opportunity to reject unbalanced or unkind offers proposed by their 
matched sellers by submitting lower purchase thresholds. Thus, this kind of model would also 
predict a fairer division of the potential gain between the two parties.  
  
3.2. The Effects of Rating Systems in the Experiment in the R treatment     
 Recent experiments with complete information about pie size have demonstrated that given 
the opportunity to express their emotion toward sellers, buyers are more likely to accept unfair 
offers in ultimatum games (e.g., Houser and Xiao 2005, Güth and Levati 2007). The effect of 
expressing emotion seen on a buyer’s attitude can be rationalized by assuming that the buyer’s 
utility weight on inequality, µi in Eq. (2), becomes smaller when it is possible to express emotion. 
If similar effects of expressing emotion are present in our experiment, the expected payoff that a 
buyer obtains may be smaller in the R treatment than in the N treatment, assuming that the 
preferences of the sellers are not affected by the buyer’s expressing emotion.   
 
Prediction 3:  Sellers (buyers) obtain higher (lower) payoffs when buyers are given the 
opportunity to rate their matched sellers. 
 
 How, then, can the seller’s decisions be affected by the rating system, while their 
preferences remain the same? Faced with the decreased µ of buyer i (i.e., µi), or, expecting the 
buyer’s more generous acceptance towards an unfair offer, even if his or her preferences are not at 
all affected, a seller would take advantage of the change in the buyer’s openness when q is high 
enough compared with the buyer’s purchase threshold. That is, the seller’s offering price would 
rise for the commodity whose q is such that q > 
 
 
     
 
   
 but is not sufficiently large, responding 
to the increase in the buyer’s purchase thresholds. Here     is the equilibrium purchase threshold 
without the rating system. However, the seller’s offering price remains the same for q such that q < 
13 
 
 
 
     
 
   
, as shown in Appendix Fig. A.2. This is because the inequality-averse seller’s preference 
for the fair division of their payoffs is not affected by the change in µ of buyer i when q is in this 
range: if the seller raised her offering price, then the income inequality would rise. Also, the 
acceptance rate of transactions rises as pb increases. 
However, there are also possibilities that sellers’ preferences might also be affected by the 
prevalence of the rating system; and there are two ways that their strategies can consequently 
change. On the one hand, the sellers may make more fair offers. Recent research on non-material 
incentives, such as verbal feedback systems, in dilemmas has proposed that people may have 
preferences to avoid receiving disapproval from others (e.g., Masclet et al. 2003, Dugar 2011, 
Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008, López-Pérez and Vorsatz 2010, Xian and Houser 2009). The 
disapproval aversion would make the sellers behave in a fairer way as unfair offers would result in 
bad ratings from the buyers. Some researchers explain the disapproval aversion by adding another 
non-material term in the utility function (e.g., López-Pérez and Vorsatz 2010), but we could 
simply interpret that the disapproval aversion makes the seller’s µ (i.e., µj in Eq. (4)) larger.  On 
the other hand, the rating system itself may make the sellers more selfish as explained in Section 1. 
Without the rating system, the sellers may feel obliged to behave in a fair manner on their own. 
With the rating system, however, instead of feeling obligated to behave fairly to their matched 
sellers and indeed doing so, the sellers would be simply able to choose to hear the criticism or 
negative ratings from their matched buyers. In other words, we could conjecture that (a) receiving 
the criticism and bad ratings from their partners, and (b) behaving nicely to the buyers are 
substitutes. If the sellers’ pro-social attitudes are crowded out by the rating system, the sellers’ 
selfishness is stimulated. We could interpret the second effect as a decrease in µj. Therefore, if 
these two forces are present in our experiment, then whether the sellers behave in a fairer way or 
more unfair way would depend on which of the two conflicting forces is stronger in the treatment 
with the rating opportunity.   
In ultimatum game experiments under complete information, many studies have 
demonstrated that sellers offer a very fair division of a pie to their matched buyers. The preference 
of sellers for a fair or even more fair division of payoffs is also shown in the similar experiments 
with buyers’ rating opportunities under the complete information set-up (e.g., López-Pérez and 
Vorsatz 2010, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008, Xiao and Houser 2009). This evidence implies 
14 
 
that the former force (i.e., the disapproval aversion) can be stronger under complete information 
settings. However, one way to predict which way the sellers would be affected in our experiment 
involves drawing attention to the fact that qt is only known to the sellers, which is different from 
these recent experiments. The relative strength of these two forces may depend on the information 
condition; and the asymmetric information may change the sellers’ fairness concerns and maybe 
the buyers’ perception of fairness as well.  As discussed in Section 1, some past experiments using 
ultimatum games have found that sellers offer a significantly smaller amount to their matched 
buyers when the buyers are not informed of the size of a pie in the games (e.g., Straub and 
Murnighan 1995, Croson 1996).
12
 Taking advantage of the incomplete information on the buyers’ 
side, the sellers strategically attempt to provide greedy offers to their matched buyers, pretending 
that they have a lower quality of a commodity (e.g., Güth et al., 1996).
13
 The experimental setup of 
incomplete information on the buyers’ side may therefore cause the latter force (i.e., stimulated 
selfishness due to the fairness crowding-out) to be stronger than the former unlike the studies 
under complete information with rating opportunities.  We can then conjecture that a seller makes 
an attempt to sell the object at a higher price even if the realized value qt is small, because his or 
her own payoff is a bigger concern than the matched buyer’s. This behavior is rationalized by a 
decrease in µj (see Appendix Fig. A.3).  
The impact of the rating system on µj can be tested as follows. Suppose that    
  and    
  are 
the average realized purchase threshold in the R treatment and the N treatment, respectively. We 
denote    as the smaller of    
  and    
 ; and also denote    as the value of the commodity where the 
average offering price is equal to    in the average realized strategy of the sellers: ps = p(q) in the 
corresponding treatment.
14
 If seller j’s preferences are not affected by the rating system, then, the 
best responses of seller j are the same in the R and N treatments for each q such that q ≤    (see 
Appendix Fig. A.2.).  Based on these considerations, we can formulate the following hypothesis: 
                                                             
12 The views on the effects of the incomplete information on sellers’ behavior are mixed, however. Other experimental 
studies in ultimatum games find little difference in the sellers’ offering behavior between the incomplete and complete 
information settings (e.g., Camerer and Loewenstein 1993). Whether our sellers behave in a greedier manner in our 
environment (i.e., when the sellers have a further opportunity to take advantage of the buyers besides the informational 
advantage) is therefore an important empirical question. 
13
 Also see Gehrig et al. (2007). 
14
 The seller’s realized strategy p = p(q) means the relation between the sellers’ offering price and the value of the 
commodity q in the data of our experiment. 
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Hypothesis A: The rating system has no effect on µj. Therefore, the realized offering prices p = 
p(q) when q ≤    are not significantly different between the N treatment and the R treatment. 
 However, if the disapproval aversion is strong as seen in the past similar experiments, that 
is, if µj is higher when the rating system is available, then the best response price of seller j is 
lower in the R treatment than in the N treatment for each q satisfying q ≤    as shown in Appendix 
Fig. A.3. Therefore, we have a different hypothesis as below in this case: 
Hypothesis B: The rating system raises µj. Therefore, the realized offering prices p = p(q) when q 
≤    are significantly lower in the R treatment than in the N treatment. 
 By contrast, if the seller becomes more selfish and µj is lower with the rating system 
available, we have the following hypothesis which is the opposite of Hypothesis B:  
Hypothesis C: The rating system lowers µj. Therefore, the realized offering prices p = p(q) when q 
≤    are significantly higher in the R treatment than in the N treatment. 
The acceptance rates are also influenced by the impact of the rating system on µj. If µj 
decreases (increases), then the income inequality-averse seller is more (less) willing to sell the 
object even when q is relatively large. This is because with µj decreasing, the seller would not care 
much about the income inequality anymore; and he or she would want to obtain a positive payoff, 
even if it is a small profit and the matched buyer obtains a higher payoff than him or her (we 
would observe the opposite motive when µj increases with the rating opportunity). As a result, we 
expect a higher (lower) acceptance rate of offers in the R treatment than in the N treatment when q 
is sufficiently high, if the distribution of µj shifts to the left (to the right) with the rating 
opportunities. By contrast, when q is small, seller j attempts to set his price to a level closer to his 
paired buyer’s purchase threshold pb in order to raise his own payoff as shown in Appendix Fig. 
A.3. This behavior of seller j raises the possibility of miscoordination between seller j and buyer i. 
That is, it would decrease the acceptance rate when q is small, unless pb changes. Therefore, we 
cannot predict in advance whether the rating system raises or lowers the acceptance rates. 
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3.3. The Impact of Social Information on Behavior in the SI and SI-R treatments 
 There are at least two possible impacts that the opportunity to observe other sellers’ 
transaction results may have on the sellers’ pricing decisions. First, social information about other 
pairs’ transaction results may facilitate future agreements between the sellers and the buyers 
because of the sellers’ adjustment in pricing. After the sellers learn potential buyers’ purchase 
thresholds, they may adjust their offering prices accordingly considering the expectation of the 
buyers. It might not be easy for them to coordinate with each other quickly without social 
information, as each seller is randomly matched with a buyer every round. If the adjustment works 
effectively, we can expect that the acceptance rate in the SI treatment is higher than in the N 
treatment and the acceptance rate in the SI-R treatment is higher than in the R treatment. The rest 
of the predictions for the SI and SI-R treatments remain the same as for the N treatment and the R 
treatment, respectively. 
 
Prediction 4:  Assuming that pb is the same, the acceptance rate of offers is higher in the SI 
treatment than in the N treatment and higher in the SI-R treatment than in the R treatment. 
 
 Second, the effects of social information might be more fundamental: it might create a 
competitive atmosphere among the sellers. For example, it is known that given the information of 
other firms’ decisions and payoffs in quantity competition experiments (oligopoly), subjects 
imitate the strategies of those who achieved the highest payoff; and as a result the market may 
become more competitive (e.g., Huck et al 1999, and Offerman et al. 2002). If sellers imitate the 
strategies of the sellers that achieved higher payoffs in our experiment, then, we would observe 
that the sellers behave in a more selfish manner both in the SI treatments, as opposed to the N 
treatment, and in the SI-R treatment, as opposed to the R treatment.  Since the lower a seller’s  
(i.e., j), the higher payoff the seller obtains given an equilibrium purchase threshold (see 
Appendix Fig. A.3), this kind of imitation behavior would cause j to decrease and his or her 
offering price to rise.
15
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 We note that imitation of this kind might not occur in our experimental setting, as the sellers have their own matched 
buyers. In the SI and SI-R treatments, the sellers are informed of the payoffs of the other buyers that are paired with 
the other four sellers in the current period, in addition to the other sellers’ offering prices and payoffs. Learning that 
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 4. Results 
 Eight sessions, two sessions per treatment, were conducted in a computer room at Brown 
University from July to October 2013. All participants were Brown undergraduate students.
16
 No 
subjects participated in more than one session for this experiment. Each session contained two 
groups, which consisted of ten subjects each, and lasted for around one hour. The value of the 
commodity qt was randomly selected every period in each session. That is, qt was the same for the 
two groups each period.
17
 No communication between subjects was permitted during sessions. The 
experiment was programmed in ztree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were paid immediately after the 
experiment was over. The average earnings were $15.81 with a standard deviation of $8.15.  
 We will first overview the average decisions of the sellers and the buyers in our experiment. 
Fig. 1(a) and (b) report the average purchase thresholds        for each realized q {0, 1, 2, …, 39, 
40} and the average offering prices        for each realized q, respectively. According to Fig. 1(a), 
       appears to be unrelated to q, which must have resulted from the fact that the buyers were not 
informed of the realized q when setting their purchase thresholds. By contrast,        appears to be 
increasing in q in all treatments as in Fig. 1(b). These figures also show that in each treatment, 
when q is small,        is below       ; and that the smaller the q the larger the difference there are 
between        and       . However, when q is very large, it seems that        exceeds       . 
Moreover, Fig. 1(d) indicates that the average acceptance rate is decreasing in q. These features 
seen in our results all closely follow Prediction 2 (the predictions from the income inequality-
averse preferences). We notice, however, that there is a vast income inequality between the sellers 
and the buyers: the average payoff of the buyers is much smaller than that of the sellers in each 
treatment. The ratios of the average buyers’ payoffs to the average sellers’ payoffs in the N, R, SI 
and SI-R treatments are .155, .121, .477, and .218, respectively.
18
 The average offering prices 
across all values of q,    , are 18.5, 20.4, 17.2 and 18.6 in the N, R, SI and SI-R treatments, 
respectively. The average purchase thresholds across all values of q,    , are 18.8, 22.6, 19.0 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
some sellers behave fairly, the sellers could imitate the fair behavior and may behave more generously, although to our 
knowledge there are no studies that demonstrated such a possibility. 
16
 They were recruited by solicitation emails via the BUSSEL (Brown University Social Science Experimental 
Laboratory). The number of female subjects is 79 (49.4% of the subjects), and the number of subjects with economics 
concentrations is 26 (16.3% of the subjects). 
17
 This feature was employed due to its simplicity. 
18
 See Appendix Table B.1. 
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21.4 in the N, R, SI and SI-R treatments, respectively. These are all close to 20, regardless of 
treatment conditions.   
 Here, we encounter one apparent tendency of their transactions in that the income 
inequality is larger in the treatments with the rating system: there are larger differences in the 
payoffs between the sellers and the buyers in the R treatment than in the N treatment, and in the 
SI-R treatment than in the SI treatment. Our data also indicates that the average accepted prices 
across all values of q are higher in the R and SI-R treatments than in the N and SI treatments. A 
closer look tells us that        and        are both higher for most values of q in the R treatment 
than in the N treatment; and in the SI-R treatment than in the SI treatment [Fig. 1(a) and (b)].  The 
higher purchase thresholds set by the buyers with the rating system available are consistent with 
the findings in the recent related papers on the effects of expressing emotion under complete 
information: expressing emotion may make buyers accept more unfair offers as the emission of 
emotion can be a substitute for rejecting the offers (e.g., Xiao and Houser 2005). However, 
intriguingly, the higher offering prices set by the sellers in the R and SI-R treatments are contrary 
to these earlier studies. Especially, the smaller the q, the larger the difference in        between the 
R (SI-R) treatment and the N (SI) treatment, which appears to resonate with Hypothesis C that we 
formulated in Section 3.2. Moreover, we find that the average acceptance rate in the R (SI-R) 
treatment is 64.0% (69.4%), which is higher than that in the N (SI) treatment, 60.6% (59.0%).  
 To formally examine the determinants of the buyers’ decisions by treatment, we conduct a 
regression analysis in which the dependent variable is their purchase threshold. In order to measure 
the effects of each treatment condition on their behavior, “other deal info” dummy (which equals 1 
in the SI or SI-R treatment; 0 otherwise), “rating” dummy (which equals 1 in the R or SI-R 
treatment; 0 otherwise), and “other rating info” dummy (which equals 1 in the SI-R treatment; 0 
otherwise) are included as independent variables. We also include a period variable {= 2, 3, …, 
50} to control the time trend, and we include “deal closed” dummy in period t − 1 (which equals 1 
if    ≥     in period t − 1; 0 otherwise) since the buyers’ decisions in a particular period may be 
affected by the transaction outcome of the period immediately before it. Moreover, the value of the 
commodity in the preceding period is also added as a control since q in the preceding period may 
19 
 
be serving as a reference point for the buyers.
19
 Our regression results indicate a clear pattern and 
confirm our observation mentioned above. As shown in Panel (A) of Table 2, the rating dummy 
obtains a significantly positive coefficient, regardless of whether the demographic data is 
controlled for. This suggests that the buyers are significantly more open to unfair offers with the 
rating systems available to them. This result implies that the recent findings also apply for a setting 
with incomplete information on the buyers’ side.  
 We also find that the buyers’ decisions are not significantly affected by the social 
information provided to the sellers; neither the other deal info nor other rating info dummy obtains 
a significant coefficient. 
 The deal closed dummy in period t – 1 obtains a significantly positive coefficient. This 
shows that the buyers whose deals were closed in period t – 1 set higher purchase thresholds in 
period t than the buyers whose deal were not closed in period t – 1. Note that the buyers whose 
deals were close are the buyers that submitted a higher purchase threshold, holding all other factors 
constant. This implies that the buyers that set higher purchase thresholds in period t – 1 continued 
to set higher purchase thresholds in period t, compared with those who set lower purchase 
thresholds.  
 
Result 1: The buyers set significantly higher purchase thresholds when they are given the 
opportunity to rate their matched sellers. The buyers’ decisions are not affected by whether the 
sellers hold information on other transaction outcomes. 
 
 Panel (B) of Table 2 reports the determinants of the sellers’ offering prices. In the 
regressions, the value of the commodity in period t, qt, is added as an independent variable because 
the sellers were informed of the realized qt when making offers unlike the buyers. The regression 
results confirm our observations above related to Fig. 1. First, qt obtains a significantly positive 
coefficient, and the coefficient is strictly less than 1.
20
 Second, the constant term is significantly 
positive. Third, since the average purchase threshold     is around 20 in each treatment, when qt is 
                                                             
19
 We note that besides this reason it would be necessary to control for qt-1 as the value of the commodity was slightly 
higher in the R treatment than in the other three treatments (see Appendix Table B.1). Responding to the addition of qt-
1, the own payoff in period t – 1 variable is not included as an independent variable in Panel (A) so as to avoid a 
multicollinearity problem: the interaction term qt-1 and the deal closed dummy in period t – 1 are instead included in 
this Panel. 
20
 Two-sided t tests find that the coefficients for qt are significantly less than 1 in columns (5) and (6). 
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sufficiently large, the average offering price        is greater than        in all of the four 
treatments.
21
 This implies that if q was sufficiently large, their deals were less likely to be closed. 
These results are all consistent with Prediction 2. This also suggests that the ratio of the sellers’ 
average demanded payoff to realized qt is decreasing in qt.
22
 This is consistent with Mitzkewitz and 
Nagel (1993) and Rapoport et al. (1996) that find that the fraction of the proposer’s share is 
decreasing in the realized size of pie in ultimatum games with incomplete information where the 
responders accept or reject the share their matched proposers demand.
23
  
  
Result 2: The following holds in all treatments: (1) The sellers’ average offering prices are 
increasing in the value of the commodity, qt. (2)              is significantly greater than 0, but is 
significantly less than 1. (3) When qt is sufficiently large (small),     is larger (smaller) than    .  
 
 Table 2 (B) also shows that              is significantly smaller in the R (SI-R) treatment 
than in the N (SI) treatment. This may suggest that    decreases with the rating systems available, 
as the smaller the    the smaller the slope tends to be.
24
 Moreover, we find that the rating dummy 
variable obtains a significantly positive coefficient. This suggests that the sellers tend to exploit 
their matched buyers more when the rating system is available. As discussed in Section 3.2, the 
significantly positive coefficient for the rating dummy may have stemmed from two factors. The 
first possible factor is the rational response of the sellers to the increase in their buyers’ purchase 
thresholds. The second possible factor is the effects of selfishness stimulated by the fairness 
crowding-out caused by the rating system (i.e., a decrease in   ) as discussed in Hypothesis C in 
the subsection. We conduct a regression analysis restricting data as outlined in Section 3.2 so as to 
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 This holds true regardless of which estimates in Table 2(B) we assume. In our data,    = 18.758, 18.976, 22.553, and 
21.347 in the N, SI, R and SI-R treatments, respectively (Appendix Table B.1). Suppose that the marginal effects of 
each independent variable on the expected value of the latent dependent variable    
     are as in column (6) of Panel 
(B), for an illustration. Then,    
     = cN  + 11.840 + .308∙q,    
     = cSI  + 11.840 − 1.051 + .308∙q,    
     = cR + 
11.840 + 1.213 + .308∙q and    
     = cSI-R + 11.840 − 1.051 + 1.213 − .078 + .308∙q in the N, SI, R and SI-R 
treatments, respectively. Here, cN, cSI, cR, and cSI-R are the average effects of all independent variables except variables 
(a) to (d) and the constant terms in each treatment, and are calculated as follows: cN = .379, cSI = .298, cR = .429, and 
cSI-R = .480. Thus, the conditions of q so that    
         are approximately calculated as q < 21.231, q < 25.614, q < 
29.451 and q < 29.036 in the N, SI, R and SI-R treatments, respectively. 
22
 Appendix Table B.7 shows that the ratio of the buyers’ payoff to realized qt is increasing in qt, which also supports 
this result. 
23
 In these studies, unlike our paper, the proposers had to split a realized pie so that both the proposers and the 
responders received non-negative payoffs. 
24
 See Appendix Fig. A.3. For a given    , the smaller   , the higher q* and the smaller the term  
 
 
    
 
   
. 
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test the significance of the second possible factor. Specifically, we test which Hypothesis (A, B or 
C) holds in our data. Since the average purchase threshold     is the lowest in the N treatment 
among the four treatments (   
 =18.76), we use the N treatment in order to restrict the set of q. The 
sellers’ average offering price        in the N treatment is largely increasing in q as shown in Fig. 
1(b), but is not monotonically increasing (see Panel (A) of Appendix Table B.2). Thus, it is 
difficult to find a precise q such that              in the N treatment. We therefore use several 
subsets of q: q ≤ 20, q ≤ 20, …, and q ≤ 25, as the condition of q satisfying           
 .
25
 Results 
are similar regardless of which subset we use: the rating dummy variable obtains a significantly 
positive coefficient at the 10% level (see Panel (B) of Appendix Table B.2).
26, 27
 This implies that 
the sellers’ average offering price is significantly higher at the 10% level with the rating 
opportunities when q is in these ranges. In other words, our data supports Hypothesis C. We 
therefore conclude that the rating system given to the buyers triggers the sellers’ selfishness (the 
distribution of    shifts downward) and causes the sellers to offer higher prices to their buyers 
even when q is not large in our experiment.  
 
Result 3: Hypothesis C holds. The sellers offer significantly higher prices to their matched buyers 
when the buyers are given the opportunity to rate their matched sellers and when q is in the range 
described in Hypothesis C. 
 
 We note that the sellers’ tendency may be affected by the presence of the social 
information on other deals provided to them as well, unlike with the buyers. Table 2 (B) indicates 
that the other deal info dummy obtains a significantly negative coefficient at the 10% level as 
shown in column (6), although not in column (5); which suggests that the information on the other 
sellers’ transaction outcomes may not create a competitive atmosphere in ultimatums. The negative 
coefficient implies that the sellers may instead act in a fairer manner with the social information. 
This may result from the setup in which sellers are aware of the payoffs of the other buyers that are 
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 Recall that in these ranges of q, the sellers’ offering prices must not significantly change with the rating system 
available unless their preferences are affected. 
26
 The coefficient estimates of the rating dummies are larger in Appendix Table B.2. than in Table 2. However, the 
significance levels of them decrease. This is simply because the number of observations used in Table B.2 is around 
the half of those in Table 2.  
27
 If we estimate the same models using only the data of the N and R treatments (the SI and SI-R treatments), we find 
that the rating dummy obtains a significantly positive coefficient at the 10% level (at the 1% level), regardless of 
which subset we use. The detailed results are omitted to conserve space. 
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paired with the other four sellers. Appendix Table B.2 (B), however, shows that these effects are 
on average insignificant as shown in columns (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v). Although there is no clear-
cut evidence on such behavioral effects, studying the impact of the information concerning buyers’ 
welfare on the sellers’ behavior would be an interesting area for future research. 
 In order to check whether the significantly higher offering prices and purchase thresholds 
seen with the rating system are due to the presence of level effects, we conduct an additional 
regression analysis whose dependent variable is either the change in the buyers’ purchase threshold 
or that in the sellers’ offering price between consecutive periods, and whose independent variables 
include the rating dummy, the other deal info dummy and the other rating info dummy. As shown 
in Appendix Table B.3, we find that the rating dummy variable no longer obtains a significant 
coefficient. This suggests that the higher offering prices and purchase thresholds in the R and SI-R 
treatments did not result from the sellers’ or buyers’ temporal adjustments of decisions through 
their changes in expectation of their counterparts’ decisions, but were in fact level effects.  
 The general tendency throughout the four treatments is that the buyers adjusted their 
purchase thresholds based on their matched sellers’ offering prices in the preceding period. The 
buyers that purchased commodities (i.e., those whose pb was greater than or equal to ps) 
significantly decrease their purchase thresholds in the following period, whereas those who did not 
purchase the commodity (i.e., those whose pb was lower than ps) significantly increase them.
28
 The 
difference in the change of pb between the former and the latter buyers is significant as shown in a 
significantly negative coefficient of the deal closed dummy (see variable (a3) in Panel (A) of Table 
3). In the treatments with the rating system, the decisions of the buyers are affected by their 
expression of emotion in the preceding period to some degree, however. The more unfair the 
transactions are or the less payoffs the buyers received, the more likely the buyers were to give 
social disapproval to their matched sellers.
29
  Furthermore, the more disapproval points they 
assigned to their matched sellers, the more likely they were to decrease their purchase thresholds in 
the following period (see variable (a6) in Panel (A) of Table 3).  
                                                             
28
 When their deals were closed, the total average difference between pb and ps was 6.86 points over the four 
treatments; and the buyers decreased their purchase thresholds by 1.68 points on average in the following period. 
When their deals were not closed, the total average difference between pb and ps was 7.07 points over the four 
treatments; and the buyers increased their purchase thresholds by 3.08 points on average in the following period. One-
sample t tests (two-sided) find that the decrease of 1.68 points and the increase of 3.08 points are each statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Results are similar when they are calculated by treatment. 
29
 See Appendix Table B.5(I). 
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 The decisions of the sellers are also affected by the rating they received in the preceding 
period to some degree. When sellers are not successful in closing the transaction, the fairer prices 
the sellers offer for a realized q or the higher payoffs the buyers otherwise obtained if their deals 
were closed, the more likely the buyers are to give social approval to their matched sellers.
30
 
Further, the more positive rating the sellers receive from their matched buyers, the more likely they 
are to raise their offering prices in the next round (variable (b10) in Panel (B) of Table 3). The 
decisions of the sellers are additionally influenced by some social information. When information 
on other deals is available to a seller, regardless of whether her offering price is accepted or 
rejected by the matched buyer, the seller is more likely to decrease (increase) her offering price in 
the following period if she learns that her group’s average accepted price was below (above) her 
own offering price (see variables (b4) to (b7) of the table). As for the impact of the information 
about other sellers’ rating scores, we find that it does not affect the sellers’ decisions. As a final 
remark about the dynamics of their decisions, we find that the sellers that sold the commodity (i.e., 
those whose pb was greater than or equal to ps) increase their offering prices in the following 
period, whereas those who were unable to sell the commodity on average decrease them.
31
 The 
difference in the change of ps between the former and the latter sellers is significant, as seen in a 
significantly positive coefficient of the deal closed dummy in Panel (B).
32
 
 
Result 4: When the deals are closed (i.e., pb ≥ ps), the buyers decrease their purchase thresholds 
and the sellers increase their offering prices in the following period. When they are not closed (i.e., 
pb < ps), the buyers increase their purchase thresholds and the sellers decrease their offering 
prices in the following period. 
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 See Appendix Table B.5(II). 
31
 See footnote 28. When their deals were closed, the sellers increased their offering prices by 1.84 points on average 
in the following period. When their deals were not closed, the sellers decreased their offering prices by 2.92 points on 
average in the following period. One-sample t tests (two-sided) find that the increase of 1.84 points and the decrease of 
2.92 points are each statistically significant at the 1% level. Results are similar when they are calculated by treatment. 
32
 In the R or SI-R treatments, the sellers were asked the prices that they would have offered if they had had a second 
chance to sell the commodity whose value was the same as q in the current period. A regression analysis confirms that 
the deal closed dummy in period t is a positive predictor for the amount of the hypothetical prices minus their already 
submitted actual prices in period t. This result is consistent with that in Panel (B). The detailed results are omitted to 
conserve space. 
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Result 5: When information on other deals is available to the sellers, the sellers adjust their 
offering prices toward their group’s average accepted price. The information about rating scores 
that other sellers received do not affect the seller’s decisions in the following period. 
   
 The acceptance rates of transactions are theoretically related to the realized purchase 
thresholds and    as discussed in Section 3. To examine the relation formally using our data, we 
conduct a regression analysis whose dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a deal 
between buyer i and seller j is closed and 0 otherwise, as shown in Appendix Table B.6. First, the 
analysis confirms our observations in Fig. 1(d): the acceptance rate is decreasing significantly in 
the value of the commodity (qt). This supports the prediction based on the income inequality-
averse preferences (Prediction 2).  Second, as shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table B.6, the 
acceptance rate is significantly higher with the rating opportunities. Fig. 1(d) especially reveals the 
higher acceptance rates in the R and SI-R treatments for higher values of q. Two possible causes 
behind the higher acceptance rates of the two treatments are: (i) higher realized purchase 
thresholds in these treatments; and (ii) more frequent acceptances for higher value of q stemming 
from a decrease in   . By using buyers’ purchase thresholds (pb), instead of q, as an independent 
variable as shown in columns (5) to (8), we find that the higher acceptance rates in the R and SI-R 
treatments result from higher pb. pb is a significantly positive predictor of the acceptance rate; and 
once pb is controlled for as an independent variable, the rating dummy variable obtains a negative 
coefficient. This resonates with the idea that the rating system makes the sellers act more selfishly, 
and makes them attempt to raise their offering prices close to their paired buyers’ expected 
purchase thresholds, raising the possibility of their transaction ending in failure.
33
 
 
Result 6: The higher the q, the lower the acceptance rate of an offer. The higher the pb, the higher 
the acceptance rate. The acceptance rate is higher when the rating opportunity is available, which 
results from higher purchase thresholds set by the buyers in the R and SI-R treatments. 
 
 Finally, to examine the consequences of having the rating system on the income inequality 
between the buyers and the sellers, we conduct a regression analysis in which the dependent 
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 We note that information on other deals provided to the sellers had little effect on the acceptance rates of offers in 
the SI and SI-R treatments. As shown in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) of Appendix Table B.6, the other deal info 
dummy fails to obtain a significant coefficient.  
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variable is the ratio of the buyer’s payoff to q, and independent variables include the rating dummy 
along with other variables. The results, found in Appendix Table B.7, confirm our earlier 
observation in Fig. 1 and Table B.1: the ratio of payoff that the buyers obtain to realized q is 
significantly smaller at the 10% level when the rating systems are available to them. One reason 
that this result is only significant at the 10% level is presumably that the number of groups is four 
in each treatment. This is, however, suggestive of a more adverse effect of the rating system under 
incomplete information and is consistent with other results that we have provided in this paper. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 This paper experimentally investigates the effects of expressing emotion when only the 
sellers are informed in advance of the values of commodities in an ultimatum game. We find that 
the buyers become more accepting of potentially unfair offers when a rating system is available to 
them. This suggests that recent findings on the impact of expressing emotion in a complete 
information environment may extend to a setting with incomplete information. However, we find 
that the sellers behave in a greedier manner when the rating system is present, unlike the results of 
previous studies under setups with complete information.  We can interpret part of this result to 
mean that receiving criticism and bad ratings can be treated by sellers as a substitute for feeling 
obligated to behave in a fair manner and actually dealing fairly. In our model, this could be 
interpreted as a decrease in sellers’  when the rating system is present. 
 Besides previous studies on disapproval aversion, our study is also related to the growing 
body of research on online reputation mechanisms. On a variety of emerging online services such 
as eBay.com and Amazon.com, users have opportunities to rate their sellers subsequent to the 
completion of transactions, and the ratings are open to the public. Recent experimental studies 
using repeated game environments have documented that such feedback opportunities may 
promote people’s non-selfish behavior, for example trust and trustworthiness between two parties 
(e.g., Keser 2002, Bolton et al. 2004), thanks to reputation effects, indirect reciprocity, and perhaps 
social disapproval aversion. Specifically, by using ultimatum games, theoretical, although not 
experimental, research has demonstrated that fairness may evolve if sellers are informed of their 
matched buyer’s past decisions (e.g., Nowak et al. 2000) or if players are allowed to choose their 
partners based on the outcomes of past interactions (e.g., Chiang 2008) under complete 
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information settings, because of the reputation effects. Our data indicates that the effects of the 
rating system, or emotional expression alone, may be more adverse with incomplete information, 
relative to settings with complete information. This result seems to suggest that other factors such 
as the reputation effects and indirect reciprocity may be crucial for fairness to evolve especially in 
settings with incomplete information when the ratings are disclosed to the sellers. It would be 
interesting to study how fairness evolves under incomplete information settings when sellers have 
access to information on buyers’ past decisions.  
 Although our first evidence showing that a rating opportunity can have a more adverse 
effect on the individuals doing the rating under asymmetric information is clear, there are many 
areas for future research. First, details of the experimental setups might affect the direction or 
degree of the effects of expressing emotion. For instance, in our design, unlike other standard 
ultimatum games with incomplete information, the payoffs of the buyers were negative if ps > q. 
This setup of ours is reasonable as it is more realistic for some circumstances, but it would also be 
a useful follow-up study to examine the effects of expressing emotion in a setup where the seller 
has to split the pie so that both she and her matched buyer obtain positive payoffs. Also, the 
framing used in experiments may affect the significance of the effects of emotional expression as 
people’s behavior is known to be sensitive to how experiments are framed.34 Second, it would be 
crucial to perform a robustness check to study the effects of expressing emotion in incomplete 
information settings using different games such as dictator games, prisoner’s dilemma games, and 
voluntary contribution games in order to establish the behavioral regularity of our hypothesis and 
to explore the conditions under which the impact of the rating system may be adverse. It is 
possible that the disapproval-averse motive is stronger than the fairness crowding-out effect in 
other game structures. Third, it would be interesting to study the effects of expressing emotion in a 
setup where the information is even more asymmetric. In our experiment, the buyers were 
informed of the true value of q at the end of each period. In some real world situations, however, 
buyers may lack the information even after their purchases. It may take months or years for the 
buyers to fully evaluate quality. In that case, buyers may not be aware of quality when they give 
their ratings. Fourth, once we build a solid observational foundation on the behavioral regularity 
for the fairness crowding-out along with the disapproval aversion, the next important step would 
                                                             
34
 For example, Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) find that subjects’ behavior can be significantly different between offer 
games and demand games when playing ultimatum games with incomplete information on the buyers’ sides. 
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be to explore these phenomena more theoretically.  Fifth, needless to say, replication studies and 
field experiments would be essential as results may depend on various factors such as culture, 
nations and subjects’ populations.  
Lastly, if our results are robust, then, they also have an implication for some firms’ 
decision-making. If customers are more likely to accept bad deals when they have options to 
express their emotion to their sellers, and if the firms care about their payoffs more than their 
customers, then, they might strategically introduce feedback opportunities that are not open to the 
public; simply listening to their criticism may be easier than making efforts to satisfy the 
customers and it may also mitigate the negative feeling that they incur from exploiting their 
customers.  
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Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
 
Treatment 
Rating  
process 
Social information  
available to sellers 
Number of 
groups 
Number of 
subjects 
N No No 4 40 
SI No 
 The offering prices by 
other sellers 
 Whether other deals are 
closed 
 The payoffs of other 
sellers 
 The payoffs of other 
buyers 
4 40 
R Yes No 4 40 
SI-R Yes 
 The offering prices of 
other sellers 
 whether other deals were 
closed 
 The payoffs of other 
sellers 
 The payoffs of other 
buyers 
 Ratings of other sellers 
4 40 
 
  
32 
 
Fig. 1: The Sellers’ Average Offering Prices and the Buyers’ Average Purchase Thresholds by the 
Value of the Commodity 
(a) The buyers’ average purchase thresholds: 
 
 
(b) The sellers’ average offering prices: 
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(c) The acceptance prices: 
 
 
(d) The average acceptance rate: 
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Table 2: The Determinants of the Buyers’ Purchase Thresholds and the Sellers’ Offering Prices  
 
(A) Dependent variable: Buyer i’s purchase threshold in period t (   
 ) 
 
 
    
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
 
  
  
(a) Value of the commodity in period 
 t−1 (qt-1) {= 0, 1, …, 39, 40} 
0.029* 
(0.015) 
0.030* 
(0.015) 
0.036* 
(0.022) 
0.036* 
(0.022) 
 
    
(b) Other deal info dummy {= 1 for the 
SI or SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
0.80 
(1.94) 
0.90 
(1.94) 
0.87 
(2.00) 
 0.97 
(2.01) 
     
(c) Rating dummy {= 1 for the R or SI-
R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
3.84** 
(1.93) 
3.83** 
(1.94) 
3.98** 
(2.01) 
3.96** 
(2.01) 
 
    
(d) Other rating info dummy {= 1 for 
the SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
-1.77 
(2.74) 
-1.99 
(2.77) 
-1.65 
(2.83) 
-1.88 
(2.86) 
     
(e) Deal closed dummy in period t−1 {= 
1 if    
   ≥    
   ; 0 otherwise} 
1.10** 
(0.50) 
1.10** 
(0.50) 
1.09** 
(0.50) 
1.10** 
(0.50) 
 
    
Interaction Terms     
(a)  (b) ---- ---- 
-0.0034 
(0.025) 
-0.0033 
(0.025) 
 
    
(a)  (c) ---- ---- 
-0.0065 
(0.025) 
-0.0065 
(0.025) 
 
    
(a)  (d) ---- ---- 
-0.0059 
(0.0351) 
-0.0060 
(0.035) 
 
    
(a)  (e)  
0.038* 
(0.0197) 
0.038* 
(0.0197) 
0.039** 
(0.020) 
0.039** 
(0.020) 
     
Period = {2, 3, …, 50} 
0.023*** 
(0.0073) 
0.023*** 
(0.0073) 
0.022*** 
(0.007) 
0.022*** 
(0.0073) 
Control Variables No Yes
1
 No Yes
1
 
Constant 
16.6*** 
(1.44) 
16.1*** 
(2.99) 
16.4*** 
(1.48) 
16.0*** 
(3.01) 
 
    
Observations 3,920 3,920 3,920 3,920 
Log Likelihood -12376 -12375 -12376 -12375 
Wald chi
2
 103.9 106.4 104.4 106.9 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  
  
 
 
Notes: Random-effects Tobit regressions. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The numbers of left-(right-) 
censored observations are 24(220) in columns (1), (2), (3) and (4). Results are similar when random-effects linear 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group ID are used. 
1 
Control variables include the female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the number of economics courses taken, the 
general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and the income of subjects’ family. None of 
them obtains a significant coefficient. We omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve 
space since these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper.  
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(B) Dependent variable: Seller j’s offering price in period t (   
 ) 
 
 
    
Independent variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
    
 
  
  
(a) Value of the commodity in period t 
(qt) {= 0, 1, …, 39, 40} 
0.31*** 
(0.0053) 
0.31** 
(0.0053) 
0.34*** 
(0.011) 
0.34*** 
(0.011) 
     
(b) Other deal info dummy {= 1 for the 
SI or SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
-0.99 
(0.61) 
-1.05* 
(0.60) 
-1.52** 
(0.68) 
-1.57** 
(0.68) 
     
(c) Rating dummy {= 1 for the R or SI-
R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
1.23** 
(0.61) 
1.21** 
(0.61) 
2.26*** 
(0.69) 
2.25*** 
(0.69) 
     
(d) Other rating info dummy {= 1 for 
the SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
-0.076 
(0.86) 
-0.078 
(0.88) 
1.09 
(0.96) 
1.09 
(0.96) 
 
    
Interaction Terms     
(a)  (b) ---- ---- 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
 
  
  
(a)  (c) ---- ---- 
-0.047*** 
(0.015) 
-0.048*** 
(0.015) 
 
  
  
(a)  (d) ---- ---- 
-0.060*** 
(0.021) 
-0.060*** 
(0.021) 
 
  
  
Own payoff in period t−1 
0.080*** 
(0.018) 
0.080*** 
(0.018) 
0.082*** 
(0.017) 
0.082*** 
(0.018) 
     
Deal closed dummy in period t−1 {= 1 
if    
   ≥    
   ; 0 otherwise} 
0.034 
(0.19) 
0.037 
(0.19) 
0.0089 
(0.19) 
0.012 
(0.19) 
     
Period = {2, 3, …, 50} 
0.016*** 
(0.0044) 
0.016*** 
(0.0044) 
0.014*** 
(0.0044) 
0.014*** 
(0.0044) 
 
    
Control Variables No Yes
1
 No Yes
1
 
Constant 
11.3*** 
(0.46) 
11.8*** 
(1.07) 
10.8*** 
(0.50) 
11.3*** 
(1.08) 
     
Observations 3,920 3,920 3,920 3,920 
Log Likelihood -10940 -10939 -10908 -10907 
Wald chi
2
 3528.0 3531.6 3649.4 3653.2 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  
  
 
Notes: Random-effects Tobit regressions. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.  The numbers of left-(right-) 
censored observations are 9(21) in columns (5), (6), (7) and (8).  Results are similar when random-effects linear 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group ID are used. 
1 
Control variables include the female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the number of economics courses taken, the 
general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and the income of subjects’ family. None of 
them obtains a significant coefficient. We omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve 
space since these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Table 3: The Dynamics of the Strategies Chosen by the Sellers and the Buyers  
 
(A) Dependent variable:    
     
    
 
 
    
 Treatment 
 N SI R SI-R 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
 
  
  
(a1) Change in the value of the 
commodity in period t−1 (qt-1 − qt-2)  
-0.0094 
(0.012) 
0.044 
(0.037) 
0.0012 
(0.0077) 
0.00048 
(0.013) 
     
(a2) Value of the commodity in 
period t−1 (qt-1) {= 0, 1, …, 39, 40} 
-0.073 
(0.040) 
-0.24 
(0.13) 
-0.069 
(0.052) 
0.30*** 
(0.038) 
     
(a3) Deal closed dummy in period t−1 
{= 1 if    
   ≥    
   ; 0 otherwise} 
-5.56*** 
(0.94) 
-7.86** 
(2.38) 
-3.84 
(1.98) 
-9.83** 
(1.95) 
     
(a4) Value of the commodity in 
period t −1 (qt-1)  Deal closed 
dummy in period t−1 {= 1 if    
   ≥ 
   
   ; 0 otherwise} 
0.072 
(0.031) 
0.052 
(0.086) 
-0.0019 
(0.046) 
0.15** 
(0.028) 
     
(a5) (Own rating − 5)  Social 
approval dummy  Deal closed 
dummy in period t−1 
--- --- 
0.0023 
(0.047) 
0.094 
(0.16) 
     
(a6) (5 − Own rating)  Social 
disapproval dummy  Deal closed 
dummy in period t−1 
--- --- 
-0.56* 
(0.21) 
-0.44* 
(0.16) 
     
(a7) (Own rating − 5)  Social 
approval dummy  (1 − Deal closed 
dummy in period t−1) 
--- --- 
0.44* 
(0.16) 
1.23 
(0.90) 
     
(a8) (5 − Own rating)  Social 
disapproval dummy  (1 − Deal 
closed dummy in period t−1) 
--- --- 
0.31 
(0.62) 
0.31 
(0.75) 
 
    
Period = {3, 4, …, 50} 
0.0086 
(0.0083) 
0.023 
(0.013) 
0.0032 
(0.0100) 
0.0028 
(0.0077) 
 
    
Constant 
4.03** 
(0.99) 
8.40* 
(2.98) 
4.19 
(2.21) 
10.53*** 
(1.71) 
     
Observations 960 960 960 960 
R-squared 0.125 0.190 0.157 0.285 
 
  
  
 
Notes: Fixed effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group ID. The social approval 
(disapproval) dummy equals 1 if buyer i’s rating to his or her matched seller is greater than or equal to (less than) 5; 0 
otherwise.*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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 (B) Dependent variable:    
     
    
 
 
 
    
 Treatment 
 N SI R SI-R 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
 
  
  
(b1) Change in the value of the commodity in  
period t−1 (        ) 
0.34*** 
(0.044) 
0.379*** 
(0.035) 
0.32*** 
(0.038) 
0.27*** 
(0.028) 
     
(b2) Deal closed dummy in period t−1 {= 1 if    
   ≥    
   ; 
0 otherwise} 
7.77*** 
(1.024) 
5.36*** 
(0.61) 
10.29*** 
(0.82) 
6.03*** 
(1.01) 
     
(b3) Own payoff in period t−1 
-0.61*** 
(0.079) 
-0.76*** 
(0.077) 
-0.65*** 
(0.051) 
-0.49** 
(0.13) 
     
(b4) (   
    – average group accepted price in period t−1)  
 1{average group accepted price in period t−1 ≤        }  Deal closed 
dummy in period t−1 
--- 
-0.067 
(0.075) 
--- 
-0.68** 
(0.15) 
     
(b5) (Average group accepted price in period t−1 –    
   )  
 1{average group accepted price in period t−1 >        }  Deal closed 
dummy in period t−1 
--- 
0.37** 
(0.10) 
--- 
0.41 
(0.25) 
     
(b6) (   
    – average group accepted price in period t−1)  
 1{average group accepted price in period t−1 ≤        } (1 − Deal 
closed dummy in period t−1) 
--- 
-0.84*** 
(0.056) 
--- 
-0.63*** 
(0.074) 
     
(b7) (Average group accepted price in period t−1 –    
   )  
 1{average group accepted price in period t−1 >        } (1 − Deal closed 
dummy in period t−1) 
--- 
0.25 
(0.11) 
--- 
0.60** 
(0.14) 
     
(b8) (Own rating − 5)  Social approval dummy  
 Deal closed dummy in period t−1 
--- --- 
-0.32* 
(0.11) 
-0.16 
(0.083) 
     
(b9) (5 − Own rating)  Social disapproval dummy  
 Deal closed dummy in period t−1 
--- --- 
-0.043 
(0.12) 
-0.026 
(0.096) 
     
(b10) (Own rating − 5)  Social approval dummy  
 (1 − Deal closed dummy in period t−1) 
--- --- 
0.61*** 
(0.063) 
0.44*** 
(0.072) 
     
(b11) (5 − Own rating)  Social disapproval dummy  
 (1 − Deal closed dummy in period t−1) 
--- --- 
-0.62 
(0.33) 
0.16 
(0.16) 
 
    
(b12) Own rating – average group mean rating  
    in period t−1 
--- --- --- 
-0.046 
(0.083) 
Period = {2, 3, …, 50} 
0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
0.030 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.0075) 
Constant 
-2.44** 
(0.71) 
0.88* 
(0.32) 
-3.57*** 
(0.36) 
-0.60** 
(0.14) 
Observations 980 950 980 980 
R-squared 0.621 0.78 0.643 0.696 
 
  
  
 
Notes: Fixed effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group ID. The social approval (disapproval) 
dummy equals 1 if buyer i’s rating to his or her matched seller is greater than or equal to (less than) 5; 0 otherwise. 1{average 
group accepted price in period t−1 ≤    
   
} equals 1 if the average group accepted price in period t−1 is less than or equal to    
   ; 0 
otherwise. 1{average group accepted price in period t−1 >       } equals 1 if the average group accepted price in period t−1 is greater than    
   ; 
0 otherwise.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.
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Appendix A: Predictions 
A.1. Standard Theory Predictions 
 For each q  [0, 40], the seller, given the buyer’s purchase threshold pb, maximizes his or 
her payoff with respect to the price   : 
        
 
 
               . 
We obtain, from this maximization problem, the best response function of the seller as follows: 
        
                                
                       
  (A1) 
 Likewise, given the seller’s strategy      , the buyer maximizes his or her expected payoff 
with respect to    as the value of the commodity is unknown to her. This reduces to the following 
maximization problem: 
                              
  
 
 
 
  
   .. (2)(( (A2) 
Suppose that       is a strictly increasing in q. Then,                             
 
  
  
  
 
 
           
 
  
  
  
      
 
. Thus, the first-order condition of the buyer is: 
   
   
 
   
      
   
    
            
         
   
      
   
    
            . 
In other words,   
            since 
   
      
   
 
 
             
  .  the condition   
       
     implies that the following condition must hold: 
        .  (A3) 
This suggests that no matter what purchase threshold buyer i submits, the payoff of the buyer is 0 (= q 
– ps(q)) when their deal is closed. 
 By contrast, suppose that       is a constant. Then,                              
  
 
 
 
  
    = ξ such that ξ   
 
 if       as then     ; but = p* such that p* < ps if      , since 
then      if       . In other words,  
      , if      ;      , if      . (A4) 
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 Therefore, we find two kinds of Bayesian Nash Equilibria, from the two best response 
functions, (A1), and (A3) or (A4). The first kind of equilibrium is the one in which that the buyer 
obtains expected earnings of 0 and only the seller obtains positive earnings. There are many 
equilibria of this kind. For instance, the following is an equilibrium: the seller proposes         
for q such that     ; and         for q such that     , and the buyer submits his or her 
purchase threshold, pb = c, for any     . In this example, the earnings of the seller are:   
 
 
 , 
which is dependent on q.  
 The second kind of equilibrium is the one in which the transaction is not exerted. For 
example, the following is an equilibrium of this class: the seller posts a price which is greater than 
or equal to 20, and the buyer sets his or her purchase threshold at 0.  
       
A.2. Inequality-Averse Preferences and Best Response Strategies 
  Suppose that a seller has the income inequality-averse preference as defined in the paper: 
usj(   ,    ) =                 
 
, where        –                 and          
 
 
   
          . Here,              when        ; = 0 otherwise. Then, given his or her matched 
buyer’s strategy,    , for each         , seller j maximizes the following payoff with respect to 
   : 
                 
 
   
         
. 
 =      
 
 
           
 
 
  
 
   
         
, (A5) 
 The term within the first curly bracket is maximized at:     
 
   
 
 
 
 , as the derivative of 
it with respect to     is:                . The value in the first curly bracket at     
 
   
 
 
 
  reduces to: 
 
 
  
 
    
. 
 Thus, given    , if q is small enough that   
 
 
    
 
   
 so that         , the seller’s best 
response function is given by:     
 
   
 
 
 
 . By contrast, if q is large enough that   
 
 
    
 
   
, 
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then,         is the seller’s best response function if the value in the curly bracket is still positive 
at        :     
 
 
           
 
 
  
 
  ; otherwise,         becomes his or her best 
response. In short, the seller’s best response function is summarized as: 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
                  
 
 
    
 
   
                                                                        
                                   
 
 
    
 
   
         
 
 
           
 
 
  
 
   
                     
 
 
    
 
   
         
 
 
           
 
 
  
 
   
  (A6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. A.1: The Best Response Strategy of the Seller 
 Here, the acceptance rate of the offering prices is q*/40 as q is randomly drawn from the 
uniform distribution between 0 and 40.  Note that the intercept in Fig. A.1 (the seller’s best 
response price at q = 0) is 
 
   
. This is not dependent on pbi.  If     
 
   
, then the seller’s best 
response strategy becomes as follows: 
      
                                    
 
 
           
 
 
  
 
  
                       
 
 
           
 
 
  
 
   
  (A7) 
For simplicity, we assume that     
 
   
 in the rest of this Appendix A.  
    
  
    
 
   
 
 
 
    
 
   
 
   
   
q* such that     
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Also, Note that 
   
    
   since    is a point at which       
 
 
  and            
 
 
  
 
 
intersect; and both curves shift to the right when pbi increases as shown in the following figure.
35
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, we find that the seller’s best response strategies shift as below responding to a chance in pbi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A.2: The Seller’s Best Response Strategies for various pbi 
Note: The solid (dashed) line indicates the best response strategy of seller j when faced with     (   
 ).  
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    can be greater than 40. In that case, the seller’s best response price is less than or equal to     for any value q  
[0,40]. 
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q** such that 
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 Likewise, suppose that the buyer also has the income inequality-averse preference as the 
seller: ubi(   ,    ) =                 
 
. Then, the buyer’s best response strategy is derived 
by maximizing the following his or her expected utility given the seller’s strategy,          : 
                  =                     
 
               . (A8) 
That is, 
                                    
 
             . (A9) 
Here, suppose that       is non-decreasing in q. Then, (A8) reduces to the following:  
                                        
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
       
 
. (A10) 
Here,   
        is the upper bound if it responds multiple values (correspondence). Since the 
condition of non-negative utility must be met, we have: 
                        
 
 
  
 
   
  
       
 
  . (A11) 
Although there are multiple equilibria, there is a common feature in that the buyer also obtains a 
positive material payoff in expectation in equilibrium. This is because condition (A11) implies 
that: 
    –         
  
       
 
             
 
 
     
  
       
 
 > 0. 
The BNE is characterized by (A6) (or A7), (A9) and (A11). 
     
 
 From Fig. A.2, we have the following features of the equilibria:  
(1) The higher the buyer’s equilibrium purchase threshold    
 , the higher the acceptance rate. 
(2) Regardless of which purchase threshold is realized in equilibrium, the seller’s equilibrium price 
is increasing in q and less than    
 , in a region where   
 
 
   
  
 
   
. 
(3) The trade would not occur in the region where q > q*. 
     
6 
 
A.3. The effects of expressing emotion on their best response strategies 
 The best response strategies of an income inequality-averse seller depend on    (Fig. A.1). 
   might be affected by the prevalence of the rating systems as discussed in the manuscript.  The 
changes in the seller’s best response strategies due to an affected    are summarized by the following 
figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A.3: The Seller’s Best Response Strategy with Affected   . 
Notes: In this figure, for simplicity, we assume that the purchase threshold of buyer i is not affected by the presence of 
the rating system. Notice that even if the purchase threshold is higher in the R treatment, the offering price of seller j is 
higher (lower) in the region that q ≤ 
 
 
    
 
   
 if µj decreases (increases). 
 
Note that 
   
   
  . See the following figure.    is a point at which       
 
 
  and   
        
 
 
  
 
 intersect as discussed before. When    decreases (increases),  
  becomes larger 
(smaller). As a result, given pbi, the lower (higher)   , the higher (lower) acceptance rate we 
observe for higher q. 
  
    
  
    
 
   
 
 
 
    
 
   
 
   
   
q* such that     
 
 
           
 
 
  
 
   
   increases 
   decreases 
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Together with the feature of the seller’s best response strategy in that her optimal offering price 
stays the same,     
 
 
  
 
   
, in the region where q ≤ 
 
 
    
 
   
 unless    change (Fig. A.2), we 
have the predictions in the manuscript. 
 
 By contrast, the opportunity to express their emotion may make the buyer’s  (i.e.,   ) 
smaller according to the recent experiments in ultimatum games with the opportunity to express 
emotion (Houser and Xiao 2005, Güth and Levati 2007). If    decreases, then condition (A10) 
approaches to the condition for a selfish material payoff-maximizing buyer; and it is possible that 
the buyer’s payoff decreases in equilibrium. 
  
     
  
  
    
 
 
    
 
   
 
   
      
 
 
  
          
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
    
     
   
   increases 
    
   decreases 
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Appendix B: Additional Figures and Tables 
 
Table B.1: The Average Offering Price and Purchase Threshold by Treatment 
 
 
      
Treatment 
name 
Average value 
of commodity 
Average 
offering price 
(   ) 
Average 
purchase 
threshold (   ) 
Average 
accepted price 
Average 
acceptance 
rate 
Average payoff 
of the sellers  
Average payoff 
of the buyers  
        
N 20.94 
18.50 
(2.21) 
18.76 
(3.94) 
16.09 
(2.82) 
60.6% 
(9.8%) 
4.57 
(1.24) 
0.71 
(1.47) 
R 22.78 
20.43 
(2.37) 
22.55 
(5.08) 
18.68 
(2.61) 
64.0% 
(7.4%) 
5.60 
(1.31) 
0.68 
(1.36) 
SI 20.16 
17.21 
(1.72) 
18.98 
(6.29) 
15.81 
(2.33) 
59.0% 
(13.0%) 
3.73 
(1.03) 
1.78 
(1.61) 
SI-R 20.44 
18.55 
(2.23) 
21.35 
(5.31) 
17.76 
(2.12) 
69.4% 
(8.9%) 
5.55 
(1.69) 
1.21 
(2.21) 
 
 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. Standard deviations are calculated using each subject’s average decisions across 50 rounds; thus, the 
number of data in calculating each standard deviation is 20. The standard deviations of the average values of commodity are not shown because they are the same 
across all subjects in each session. 
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Table B.2: The Effects of Treatment Conditions on the Sellers’ Offering Prices (Supplementing Table 2(B) in the paper) 
 
(A) The average offering price by the value of commodities in the N treatment 
 
q 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
     17.8 14 16.5 20.1 18.2 18.6 18.4 19.1 
 
q 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
     19.6 17.8 18.5 19.6 20.0 -- 20.9 21.0 
 
 (B) Regression results for restricted sets of data 
 
Dependent variable: Seller j’s offering price in period t (   
 ) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Range of q 
 
Independent 
variables 
q ≤ 20 q ≤ 21 q ≤ 22 q ≤ 23 q ≤ 24 q ≤ 25 
 (i)  (i’)  (ii)  (ii’) (iii)  (iii’) (iv) (iv’)  (v)  (v’) (vi)  (vi’) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
(a) Value of the 
commodity in 
period t (qt) {= 0, 
1, …, 39, 40} 
0.26*** 
(0.013) 
0.29*** 
(0.028) 
0.27*** 
(0.012) 
0.29*** 
(0.023) 
0.27*** 
(0.011) 
0.29*** 
(0.022) 
0.28*** 
(0.010) 
0.29*** 
(0.022) 
0.27*** 
(0.0098) 
0.29*** 
(0.021) 
0.28*** 
(0.0090) 
0.29*** 
(0.019) 
             
(b) Other deal info 
dummy {= 1 for 
the SI or SI-R 
treatment; = 0 
otherwise} 
-1.51* 
(0.90) 
-1.96** 
(0.98) 
-1.44 
(0.88) 
-2.06** 
(0.96) 
-1.37 
(0.85) 
-2.09** 
(0.93) 
-1.25 
(0.82) 
-2.14** 
(0.90) 
-1.28 
(0.81) 
-2.02** 
(0.89) 
-1.22 
(0.78) 
-2.11** 
(0.85) 
             
(c) Rating dummy 
{= 1 for the R or 
SI-R treatment; = 
0 otherwise} 
1.65* 
(0.91) 
2.51** 
(1.00) 
1.64* 
(0.89) 
2.48** 
(0.97) 
1.59* 
(0.86) 
2.49*** 
(0.94) 
1.57 
(0.83) 
2.42*** 
(0.91) 
1.53* 
(0.82) 
2.44*** 
(0.90) 
1.59** 
(0.78) 
2.21** 
(0.86) 
             
(d) Other rating 
info dummy {= 1 
for the SI-R 
treatment; = 0 
otherwise} 
0.50 
(1.28) 
1.04 
(1.38) 
0.46 
(1.25) 
1.10 
(1.35) 
0.48 
(1.21) 
0.97 
(1.31) 
0.35 
(1.16) 
1.08 
(1.26) 
0.39 
(1.15) 
0.96 
(1.25) 
0.31 
(1.10) 
1.14 
(1.20) 
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Interaction Terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)  (b) --- 
0.048 
(0.038) 
--- 
0.063* 
(0.033) 
--- 
0.070** 
(0.032) 
--- 
0.078*** 
(0.030) 
--- 
0.061** 
(0.028) 
--- 
0.071*** 
(0.026) 
(a)  (c) --- 
-0.084** 
(0.039) 
--- 
-0.081** 
(0.036) 
--- 
-0.083** 
(0.034) 
--- 
-0.074** 
(0.031) 
--- 
-0.077*** 
(0.030) 
--- 
-0.046* 
(0.026) 
(a)  (d) --- 
-0.061 
(0.053) 
--- 
-0.067 
(0.050) 
--- 
-0.048 
(0.046) 
--- 
-0.062 
(0.042) 
--- 
-0.044 
(0.040) 
--- 
-0.068* 
(0.036) 
  
 
 
 
        
Own payoff in 
period t − 1 
0.083*** 
(0.023) 
0.079*** 
(0.023) 
0.082*** 
(0.022) 
0.076*** 
(0.022) 
0.087*** 
(0.022) 
0.083*** 
(0.022) 
0.085*** 
(0.021) 
0.083*** 
(0.021) 
0.079*** 
(0.020) 
0.079*** 
(0.020) 
0.072*** 
(0.020) 
0.070*** 
(0.020) 
             
Deal closed dummy 
in period t − 1 {= 1 
if    
   ≥    
   ; 0 
otherwise} 
-0.041 
(0.24) 
-0.015 
(0.24) 
-0.015 
(0.24) 
0.030 
(0.24) 
-0.028 
(0.23) 
-0.0039 
(0.23) 
0.0047 
(0.23) 
0.028 
(0.23) 
0.072 
(0.22) 
0.077 
(0.22) 
0.17 
(0.22) 
0.20 
(0.21) 
             
Period = {2, 3, …, 
50} 
0.051*** 
(0.0058) 
0.052*** 
(0.0058) 
0.052*** 
(0.0057) 
0.053*** 
(0.0058) 
0.049*** 
(0.0056) 
0.051*** 
(0.0057) 
0.048*** 
(0.0055) 
0.050*** 
(0.0055) 
0.046*** 
(0.0053) 
0.047*** 
(0.0053) 
0.043*** 
(0.0052) 
0.044*** 
(0.0052) 
             
Constant 
10.3*** 
(1.60) 
9.95*** 
(1.62) 
10.2*** 
(1.56) 
9.94*** 
(1.58) 
10.2*** 
(1.51) 
9.96*** 
(1.53) 
10.07*** 
(1.46) 
9.89*** 
(1.47) 
10.14*** 
(1.44) 
9.9*** 
(1.46) 
10.19*** 
(1.38) 
10.1*** 
(1.40) 
             
Observations 1,780 1,780 1,880 1,880 1,970 1,970 2,100 2,100 2,180 2,180 2,330 2,330 
Log Likelihood -4775 -4763 -5046 -5033 -5291 -5278 -5627 -5610 -5825 -5809 -6231 -6217 
Wald chi
2
 485.5 513.7 593.2 626.4 701.0 736.8 831.3 879.6 918.8 964.9 1110.2 1153.0 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Notes: Random-effects Tobit regressions. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. Results are similar when random-effects linear regressions with robust 
standard errors clustered by group ID are used. 
 Besides these independent variables, the female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the number of economics courses taken, the general political orientation (1 
= very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and the income of subjects’ family are included. We omitted the estimated coefficients of these variables to conserve 
space, since these are not related to our hypothesis. The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 9(1), 9(1), 9(1), 9(1), 9(1), and 9(2) in columns (i) and 
(i’), columns (ii) and (ii’), columns (iii) and (iii’), columns (iv) and (iv’), columns (v) and (v’), and columns (vi) and (vi’), respectively. 
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.
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Table B.3: The Dynamics of the Strategies of the Buyers and the Sellers (Supplementing Table 2 
and Table 3 of the paper) 
 
(A) Dependent variable:    
     
    
 
 
 
 
Notes: Random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group ID. 
 
1 
Control variables include the female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the number of economics courses taken, the 
general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and the income of subjects’ family. None of 
them obtains a significant coefficient. We omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve 
space since these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper. 
    *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
  
 
  
Independent variables (1) (2) 
 
  
 
  
Change in the value of the commodity  
in period  t −1 (qt-1 − qt-2) 
0.0073 
(0.010) 
0.0074 
(0.010) 
   
Value of the commodity  
in period t −1 (qt-1) {= 0, 1, …, 39, 40} 
-0.16*** 
(0.045) 
-0.16*** 
(0.045) 
   
Deal closed dummy in period t − 1 {= 1 if    
   ≥ 
   
   ; 0 otherwise} 
-7.52*** 
(1.03) 
-7.55*** 
(1.03) 
   
Value of the commodity in period t −1 (qt-1)  Deal 
closed dummy in period t − 1 {= 1 if    
   ≥    
   ; 0 
otherwise} 
0.0989*** 
(0.0252) 
0.098*** 
(0.026) 
   
Other deal info dummy {= 1 for the SI or SI-R 
treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
-0.32 
(0.40) 
-0.26 
(0.35) 
   
Rating dummy {= 1 for the R or SI-R treatment; = 
0 otherwise} 
0.25 
(0.36) 
0.23 
(0.33) 
   
Other rating info dummy {= 1 for the SI-R 
treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
0.31 
(0.47) 
0.21 
(0.49) 
   
Period = {3, 4, …, 50} 
0.004 
(0.0048) 
0.0041 
(0.0048) 
   
Control Variables No Yes1 
Constant 
6.80*** 
(1.36) 
6.19*** 
(1.39) 
Observations 3,840 3,840 
R-square 0.1766 0.1766 
Wald chi
2
 127.2 281.7 
Prob > chi
2 
0.000 0.000 
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 (B) Dependent variable:    
     
    
 
 
 
  
Independent variables (3) (4) 
 
  
 
  
Change in the value of the commodity  
in period t (       ) 
0.33*** 
(0.019) 
0.33*** 
(0.019) 
   
Deal closed dummy  
in period t − 1 {= 1 if    
   ≥    
   ; 0 otherwise} 
-0.54*** 
(0.045) 
-0.55*** 
(0.046) 
   
Own payoff in period t − 1 6.90*** 
(0.47) 
6.95*** 
(0.47) 
   
Other deal info dummy {= 1 for the SI or SI-R 
treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
-0.34 
(0.26) 
-0.36 
(0.24) 
   
Rating dummy {= 1 for the R or SI-R treatment;  
= 0 otherwise} 
0.28 
(0.30) 
0.25 
(0.30) 
   
Other rating info dummy {= 1 for the SI-R treatment; 
= 0 otherwise} 
0.0038 0.011 
(0.49) (0.48) 
   
Period = {2, 3, …, 50} 0.0088 
(0.0057) 
0.0088 
(0.0058) 
   
Control Variables No Yes1 
   
Constant 
-1.90*** 
(0.36) 
-1.90*** 
(0.51) 
Observations 3,920 3,920 
R-square 0.6344 0.6345 
Wald chi
2
 706.3 893.5 
Prob > chi
2 
0.000 0.000 
 
  
 
Notes: Random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group ID.  
 
1 
Control variables include the female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the number of economics courses taken, the 
general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and the income of subjects’ family. None of 
them obtains a significant coefficient. We omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve 
space since these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper.  
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table B.4: The Dynamics of the Strategies of the Sellers (Supplementing Table 3 (B) of the draft) 
 
Dependent variable:    
     
    
 
 
    
 Treatment 
 N SI R SI-R 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
 
  
  
        
0.34*** 
(0.044) 
0.37*** 
(0.036) 
0.32*** 
(0.038) 
0.27*** 
(0.030) 
     
Deal closed dummy in period t−1 {= 1 if    
   ≥    
   ; 
0 otherwise} 
7.77*** 
(1.02) 
6.51*** 
(0.96) 
10.3*** 
(0.82) 
6.14*** 
(1.01) 
     
Own payoff in period t−1 
-0.61*** 
(0.079) 
-0.78*** 
(0.093) 
-0.65*** 
(0.051) 
-0.56** 
(0.14) 
     
(Maximum group accepted price in period t−1 − 
   
   )  Deal closed dummy in period t−1 --- 
0.21 
(0.094) 
--- 
0.35** 
(0.067) 
     
(Maximum group accepted price in period t−1 − 
   
   )  (1 − Deal closed dummy in period t−1) --- 
0.82*** 
(0.11) 
--- 
0.70** 
(0.13) 
     
(Maximum group accepted price in period t−1 − 
   
   )  (1 − Deal closed dummy in period t−1)  
 1{Maximum group accepted price in period t−1 >       } 
--- 
-0.60* 
(0.22) 
--- 
-0.31 
(0.16) 
     
(Own rating − 5)  Social approval dummy  
 Deal closed dummy in period t−1 
--- --- 
-0.32* 
(0.11) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
     
(5 − Own rating)  Social disapproval dummy  
 Deal closed dummy in period t−1 
--- --- 
-0.043 
(0.12) 
-0.022 
(0.043) 
     
(Own rating − 5)  Social approval dummy  
 (1 − Deal closed dummy in period t−1) 
--- --- 
0.61*** 
(0.063) 
0.42*** 
(0.066) 
     
(5 − Own rating)  Social disapproval dummy  
 (1 − Deal closed dummy in period t−1) 
--- --- 
-0.62 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
 
    
(Maximum group rating − Own rating) in period t−1 --- --- --- 
0.023 
(0.065) 
Period = {2, 3, …, 50} 
0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.014 
(0.0094) 
0.030 
(0.014) 
-0.0040 
(0.0082) 
 
    
Constant 
-2.44** 
(0.71) 
-0.37 
(0.39) 
-3.57*** 
(0.36) 
-1.40** 
(0.26) 
Observations 980 950 980 980 
R-squared 0.621 0.768 0.643 0.691 
 
  
  
 
Notes: Fixed effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group ID. The social approval 
(disapproval) dummy equals 1 if buyer i’s rating to his or her matched seller is greater than or equal to (less than) 5; 0 
otherwise. 1{Maximum group accepted price in period t−1 >       } equals 1 if Maximum group accepted price in period t−1 >     
   ; 0 
otherwise.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table B.5: The Determinants of the Rating Decisions by the Buyers 
 
 
(I) When their deals were closed: 
 
  Dependent variable: Rating that a buyer assigned to his or her matched seller in period t 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Random effects Tobit regressions. Only the observations whose deals were closed in the R or SI-R treatments 
are used. The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 301(260) in columns (1) and (2), and are 301(258) in 
column (3) and (4). Results are similar when random-effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by 
group ID are used. 
 
1 
Control variables include, for both the buyers and the sellers, the female dummies (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the 
numbers of economics courses taken, the general political orientations (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and 
the incomes of subjects’ family. We omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve 
space since these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper.  
    *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
  
 
 
   
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
   
 
 
   
Buyer’s payoff in period t 
(i.e., q − ps) 
0.43*** 
(0.021) 
0.44*** 
(0.020) 
---- ---- 
     
Seller’s payoff in period t 
(i.e., ps − q/2) 
-0.10** 
(0.041) 
-0.090** 
(0.040) 
---- ---- 
     
     ’                    
      ’                    
 
 
---- ---- 
0.67*** 
(0.047) 
0.67*** 
(0.047) 
     
SI-R Treatment dummy 
{= 1 for the SI-R treatment;  
0 for the R treatment} 
-0.061 
(0.27) 
-0.066 
(0.22) 
0.47 
(0.44) 
0.28 
(0372) 
     
Period = {1, 2, …, 50} 
-0.010 
(0.0065) 
-0.010 
(0.0064) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
     
Control Variables No Yes
1
 No Yes
1
 
Constant 
5.62*** 
(0.43) 
4.75*** 
(0.76) 
4.77*** 
(0.42) 
4.62*** 
(1.17) 
Observations 1,334 1,334 1,329 1,329 
Log likelihood -2343 -2321 -2924 -2915 
Wald chi
2
 1625.2 1679.3 208.6 228.1 
Prob > chi
2 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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(II) When their deals were not closed: 
 
 
Dependent variable: Rating that a buyer assigned to his or her matched seller in period t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Random effects Tobit regressions. Only the observations whose deals were not closed in the R or SI-R 
treatments are used. The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 97(71) in columns (5) and (6), and are 
97(70) in column (7) and (8). Results are similar when random-effects linear regressions with robust standard errors 
clustered by group ID are used. 
 
1 
Control variables include, for both the buyers and the sellers, the female dummies (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the 
numbers of economics courses taken, the general political orientations (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and 
the incomes of subjects’ family. We omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve 
space since these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper.  
    *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
  
 
 
   
Independent variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
   
 
 
   
(a) Payoff that a buyer would have received  
if their deal had been closed in period t  
(i.e., q − ps) 
0.34*** 
(0.026) 
0.33*** 
(0.026) 
---- ---- 
     
(b) Payoff that a seller would have received  
if their deal had been closed in period t  
(i.e.,  ps − q/2) 
0.067 
(0.049) 
0.045 
(0.050) 
---- ---- 
     
            
            
 
 
---- ---- 
0.35*** 
(0.045) 
0.35*** 
(0.044) 
     
SI-R Treatment dummy 
{= 1 for the SI-R treatment;  
0 for the R treatment} 
-1.10*** 
(0.32) 
-1.06*** 
(0.34) 
-1.85*** 
(0.42) 
-1.72*** 
(0.42) 
     
Period = {1, 2, …, 50} 
-0.015* 
(0.0061) 
-0.016** 
(0.0079) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
     
Control Variables No Yes
1
 No Yes
1
 
Constant 
4.36*** 
(0.67) 
4.89*** 
(1.22) 
6.29*** 
(0.40) 
5.62*** 
(1.36) 
Observations 666 666 664 664 
Log likelihood -1388 -1377 -1559 -1546 
Wald chi
2
 541.9 568.6 90.8 121.1 
Prob > chi
2 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table B.6: The Determinants of the Acceptance Rates of Offers 
 
 
    Dependent variable: The acceptance rate of a transaction between buyer i and seller j in period t  
 
 
    
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
 
  
  
(a) Value of the commodity in period t 
(qt) {= 0, 1, …, 39, 40} 
-0.030*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.030*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.048*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.049*** 
(0.0039) 
 
    
(b) Other deal info dummy {= 1 for the 
SI or SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
-0.070 
(0.092) 
-0.029 
(0.084) 
-0.72*** 
(0.15) 
-0.69*** 
(0.14) 
     
(c) Rating dummy {= 1 for the R or SI-
R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
0.16* 
(0.092) 
0.18** 
(0.085) 
0.11 
(0.16) 
0.13 
(0.16) 
 
    
(d) Other rating info dummy {= 1 for 
the SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
0.15 
(0.13) 
0.088 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.22) 
0.012 
(0.21) 
     
Interaction Terms 
  
  
 
  
  
(a)  (b) 
---- ---- 
0.030*** 
(0.0053) 
0.031*** 
(0.0053) 
 
    
(a)  (c) ---- ---- 
0.0041 
(0.0055) 
0.0042 
(0.0056) 
 
    
(a)  (d)  ---- ---- 
0.0011 
(0.0075) 
0.00128 
(0.0075) 
     
Period = {1, 2, …, 50} 
0.0050*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0050*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0052*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0053*** 
(0.0015) 
 
    
Control Variables No Yes1 No Yes1 
Constant 
0.79*** 
(0.084) 
0.58*** 
(0.18) 
1.19*** 
(0.12) 
1.00*** 
(0.20) 
 
    
Observations 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 
Log Likelihood -2461 -2443 -2425 -2406 
Wald chi
2
 282.2 317.3 336.5 372.0 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  
  
 
 
Notes: Random-effects Probit regressions. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
1 
Control variables include the female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the number of economics courses taken, the 
general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and the income of subjects’ family. We omitted 
the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve space since these are not related to the hypotheses 
in the paper. 
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(continuing) 
 
 
 
    
Independent variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
    
 
    
(a’) Purchase threshold of buyer i (Pbi) 
0.20*** 
(0.0064) 
0.20*** 
(0.0066) 
0.20*** 
(0.014) 
0.20*** 
(0.014) 
 
    
(b) Other deal info dummy {= 1 for the 
SI or SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
0.049 
(0.14) 
0.072 
(0.14) 
0.70** 
(0.32) 
0.72* 
(0.32) 
     
(c) Rating dummy {= 1 for the R or SI-
R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
-0.55*** 
(0.14) 
-0.54*** 
(0.14) 
-1.25*** 
(0.41) 
-1.24*** 
(0.41) 
 
    
(d) Other rating info dummy {= 1 for 
the SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
0.40** 
(0.20) 
0.40** 
(0.20) 
0.038 
(0.53) 
0.068 
(0.53) 
     
Interaction Terms 
    
     
(a’)  (b) ---- ---- 
-0.039** 
(0.017) 
-0.039** 
(0.017) 
 
    
(a’)  (c) ---- ---- 
0.035* 
(0.020) 
0.035* 
(0.020) 
 
   
 
(a’)  (d) ---- ---- 
0.026 
(0.026) 
0.024 
(0.026) 
 
    
Period = {1, 2, …, 50} 
-0.00067 
(0.0018) 
-0.00056 
(0.0018) 
-0.00098 
(0.0018) 
-0.00086 
(0.0018) 
 
    
Control Variables No Yes1 No Yes1 
Constant 
-3.25*** 
(0.15) 
-3.40*** 
(0.29) 
-3.30*** 
(0.26) 
-3.46*** 
(0.37) 
 
    
Observations 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 
Log Likelihood -1626 -1622 -1615 -1611 
Wald chi
2
 982.0 978.5 959.2 955.3 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
    
 
Notes: Random-effects Probit regressions. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
1 
Control variables include the female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the number of economics courses taken, the 
general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and the income of subjects’ family. We omitted 
the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve space since these are not related to the hypotheses 
in the paper. 
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table B.7: The Determinants of the Ratios of Payoff the Buyers Obtained to Realized qt 
 
 
  Dependent variable: The payoff of a buyer divided by the value of commodity in period t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group ID. Only the observations 
whose q are greater than 0 are used.  
1 
Control variables include the female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), the number of economics courses taken, the 
general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and the income of subjects’ family. We omitted 
the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve space since these are not related to the hypotheses 
in the paper. 
    *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value of the commodity in period t 
(qt) {= 0, 1, …, 39, 40} 
0.070*** 
(0.010) 
0.070*** 
(0.010) 
   
Other deal info dummy {= 1 for the SI 
or SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
0.062 
(0.063) 
0.088 
(0.065) 
   
Rating dummy {= 1 for the R or SI-R 
treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
-0.38* 
(0.21) 
-0.35* 
(0.21) 
   
Other rating info dummy {= 1 for the 
SI-R treatment; = 0 otherwise} 
0.077 
(0.34) 
0.030 
(0.22) 
   
Period = {1, 2, …, 50} 
-0.0025 
(0.0036) 
-0.0025 
(0.0036) 
   
Control Variables No Yes
1
 
Constant 
-1.67*** 
(0.28) 
-1.68*** 
(0.31) 
Observations 3,880 3,880 
R-square 0.1905 0.1905 
Wald chi
2
 75.55 96.77 
Prob >  chi
2 
0.00 0.00 
 
 
 
